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The economic welfare implications of some countries using new genetically modified varieties in 
crop production will depend on which countries choose to adopt them and on whether others 
(notably Western Europe) ban their importation. They also depend on existing (non-GMO-
specific) agricultural policies in affected markets. This paper uses a well-received empirical 
economy-wide model of the global economy (GTAP) to quantify the effects of selected countries 
enjoying an assumed degree of productivity growth from adopting GMO maize and soybean. It 
does so first by leaving existing distortionary policies in place and then assuming agricultural 
policies in Western Europe are completely liberalised. In both cases we investigate the effects of 
Western Europe refraining from using GMO technology in its own farm production but without 
versus with a ban on imports of GM products. The results suggest that (a) such an import ban 
would have a large adverse effect on economic welfare, particularly in Western Europe itself, 
and (b) while estimated global economic welfare benefits from the new biotechnology are not 
greatly reduced by Europe’s traditional price-distorting policies, the reductions in technology 
gains are concentrated in non-European countries. 
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  It is of course fitting that a symposium commemorating John Dillon should focus on the 
economics of agricultural research, since that was such an integral part of John’s professional 
life. His teaching career began at the University of Adelaide’s Department of Economics, where 
he was appointed a Senior Lecturer in 1961 (Anderson and O’Neil 2002). He was promoted to 
Reader/Associate Professor in 1964, just before moving to the University of New England to 
become its Foundation Professor of Farm Management. The agricultural economics group at 
Adelaide at that time was small (it included Alan Powell as a Lecturer during 1962-64), but it 
made its mark under the leadership of Professor Frank Jarrett. Papers on the economics of 
agricultural research to come out of that era include the seminal contribution by Lindner and 
Jarrett (1978). Agricultural economics teaching was provided not only to economics students on 
North Terrace but also to agricultural science students at the Waite campus. Among the Waite 
graduates who went on to distinguished careers in the economics of agricultural research were 
Derek Byerlee from the 1960s (who did a Masters under John Dillon at UNE before going on to 
doctoral studies in the US and a career at CIMMYT and the World Bank) and Phil Pardey from 
the 1970s (now a Professor at Minnesota after periods at ISNAR and IFPRI). 
The post-World War II literature on the economics of agricultural research initially was 
concerned with the investments being made in the middle half of the twentieth century in the US. 
This was followed by a second generation of studies that was stimulated from the 1960s by the 
Green Revolution of dwarf cereal varieties targeted at boosting yields in developing countries. 
We are now entering a third generation, which is drawing on the new biotechnology revolution. 
While that began to take hold in the advanced economies in the 1990s, it has enormous potential 
also for developing countries (Evenson 2002). How quickly and comprehensively that potential 





organisms (GMOs), especially in Western Europe, and associated policy responses by 
governments. 
Current debates about the new agricultural biotechnologies that are generating GMOs 
appear to reveal substantially different perceptions of the associated risks and benefits among 
consumers, ethicists, policymakers and even some scientists. Growing genetically modified crop 
varieties provides farmers with desirable agronomic and farmer health benefits such as resistance 
to insect pests or tolerance to herbicides used to control weeds. In the near future GM products 
may also have attributes desired by consumers such as vitamin enrichment (e.g., golden rice). 
However, serious concerns are being voiced about both the longer-term environmental impact of 
cultivating GM crops and the safety of foods containing GMOs. Scepticism toward genetic 
engineering has been particularly noticeable in Western Europe, and the development and use of 
genetically engineered products there and elsewhere has been stunted as a result. In contrast, 
farmers in North America and several large developing countries such as Argentina and China 
have adopted genetically modified crops as they have become available, and citizens there have 
generally accepted that on-going development as if the GM-inclusive and GM-free products are 
the same.  
The apparent wide range in perceptions of the nature of this new biotechnology, together 
with the extreme (and far from optimal) policy responses to date by the two major players (the 
EU and US), complicates the analysis of the economic effects of this agricultural research. But 
four other factors add further complications. First, since the first two GM crops to be 
successfully adopted on a large scale (corn and soybean) are widely traded internationally and 
are readily adopted once released, a global economic model is needed to capture the international 
spillovers (Alston 2002). Second, since those two crops are key inputs into livestock production 
and processed food, a multimarket model is needed to capture those interactions (Alston 1991). 
Third, since those and other crops being genetically modified by scientists are a non-trivial part 
of household earnings and spending in many poor countries, an economy-wide rather than just 
partial-equilibrium perspective is required. And fourth, since those product markets are subject to 
major price-support policies in Europe and elsewhere, which are under pressure to be reformed, 
the impacts of existing protectionist policy measures on the benefits of the research, and of 
policy reactions to it, need to be taken into account (Alston, Edwards and Freebairn 1988). Given 





have been partial equilibrium in nature,
1 a more appropriate tool for analysing the production, 
trade and welfare effects of GMO technology adoption is a global, computable general 
equilibrium model. This is the approach to be taken here, using the well-received GTAP model 
(described in detail in Hertel 1997).  
Specifically, the effects of an assumed degree of productivity growth in the maize and 
soybean sectors in selected non-European countries are explored. The paper first summarizes the 
authors’ earlier analysis which focuses on effects on world production and trade patterns and on 
national economic welfare of selected (non-European) countries adopting genetically modified 
(GM) crops without and then with Western Europe choosing to ban imports of those products 
from countries adopting GM technology. That ban is shown to have non-trivial economic 
implications for both developed and developing country agricultural-exporters. We then compare 
those results with what they would be in the absence of Western Europe’s distortionary 
agricultural policies, to examine the extent to which those price-support policies affect the 
various regions’ welfare gains from the new biotechnology. In their survey of partial equilibrium 
analyses of the effects of distortionary policies on research benefits, Alston Edwards and 
Freebairn (1988) conclude that, while such policies typically have little impact on the global 
level of benefits, they do influence the distribution of those benefits within and between 
countries. Our study provides an opportunity to see to what extent that is also true in this case 
when general equilibrium analysis is used. 
  
Estimating economic effects of GMO adoption and of policy reactions
2 
 
This section examines empirically the production, trade and welfare effects of GM crop 
adoption by selected regions, first without and then with a specific policy response in Western 
Europe, namely a ban on imports of maize and soybean from GM-adopting countries. This is 
done using an applied analytical framework involving a global economy-wide model and 
database known as GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project).
3 Being a general equilibrium model, 
GTAP describes both the vertical and horizontal linkages between all product markets both 
                                                 
1 In their excellent, in-depth survey of methodologies for evaluating agricultural research, Alston, Norton and 
Pardey (1995) devote less than two of their 600 pages to general equilibrium analysis. 





within the model's individual countries and regions as well as between countries and regions via 
their bilateral trade flows. The database used for this application reflects the global economic 
structures and trade flows of 1995 (GTAP database Version 4 – see McDougall et al. 1998) and 
has been aggregated to highlight the main participating regions and the sectors affected by the 
GMO debate.  
Currently it is primarily maize and soybean that are benefiting most from GMO food 
technology. Hence the scenarios analysed here assume that GM-driven productivity growth 
occurs only in the following GTAP sectors: cereal grains (excluding wheat and rice) and 
oilseeds. Detailed empirical information about the impact of GMO technology in terms of 
reduced chemical use, higher yields and other agronomic improvements is at this stage quite 
limited (see e.g. OECD (1999) and Nelson et al. (1999)). Available empirical evidence (e.g. 
USDA 1999 and James 1999) does, however, suggest that cultivating GM crops has general cost-
reducing effects. The scenarios analysed here are therefore based on a simplifying assumption 
that the effect of adopting GM crops can be captured by a Hicks-neutral technology shift, i.e. a 
uniform reduction in all inputs to obtain the same level of production. For present purposes the 
GM-adopting sectors are assumed to experience a one-off increase in total factor productivity of 
5%, thus lowering the supply price of the GM crop
4. Assuming sufficiently elastic demand 
conditions, the cost-reducing technology will lead to increased production and higher returns to 
the factors of production employed in the GM-adopting sector. Labour, capital and land 
consequently will be drawn into the affected sector. As suppliers of inputs and buyers of 
agricultural products, other sectors will also be affected by the use of genetic engineering in GM-
potential sectors through vertical linkages. Input suppliers will initially experience lower demand 
because the production process in the GM sector has become more efficient. To the extent that 
the production of GM crops increases, however, the demand for inputs by producers of those 
crops may actually rise despite the input-reducing technology. Demanders of primary 
agricultural products such as grains for livestock feed will benefit from lower prices, which in 
turn will affect the market competitiveness of livestock products. 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 The GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) model is a multi-regional, static, applied general equilibrium model 
based on neo-classical microeconomic theory.  See Hertel (1997) for comprehensive documentation. 
4 Due to the absence of sufficiently detailed empirical data on the agronomic and hence economic impact of 
cultivating GM crops, the 5% productivity shock applied here represents an average shock (over both commodities 
and regions). Changing this shock (e.g. doubling it to 10%) generates near-linear changes (i.e. roughly a doubling) 





The widespread adoption of GM varieties in certain regions will affect international trade 
flows depending on how traded the crop in question is and whether or not this trade is restricted 
specifically because of the GMOs involved. To the extent that trade is not further restricted and 
not currently subject to binding tariff quotas,
5 world market prices for these products will have a 
tendency to decline and thus benefit regions that are net importers of these products. For 
exporters, the lower price may or may not boost their trade volume, depending on price 
elasticities in the various markets. Welfare in the exporting countries would go down for non-
adopters but could also go down for some adopters if the adverse terms of trade change were to 
be sufficiently strong. Hence the need for empirical analysis. 
Two scenarios are considered in this section. The first is a base case with no policy or 
consumer reactions to GMOs, while the second imposes on this base case a ban on imports of the 
two products from GM-adopting countries. The base scenario examines the implications of 
widespread adoption of GM maize and soybeans in a number of current and potential biotech 
front-runner countries: North America including Mexico, the Southern Cone region of Latin 
America, India, China, East Asia's other lower-income countries, and South Africa. The 
countries of Western Europe and elsewhere are assumed to refrain completely from the use of 
GM crops in their production systems. For the EU this may be interpreted as an extension of the 
de facto moratorium that has been in place there since June 1999, awaiting the adoption of 
tighter laws on GMOs. Most notably among the developing countries, Sub-Saharan Africa is 
assumed to be unable to take advantage of the new technology. As mentioned above, the 
technology change is assumed to imply a 5% productivity growth in the adopting sectors. 
Moreover, consumers are assumed not to be concerned about the introduction of GM crops in the 
agri-food system, and hence genetically modified and conventional crops are produced side-by-
side and traded in one co-mingled market. There are no restrictions on trade with genetically 
modified products in this first scenario. 
In the second scenario, Western Europe not only continues to refrain from using GM 
crops in its own domestic production systems, but the region is also assumed to reject imports of 
oilseeds and coarse grains from GM-adopting regions. It is assumed that the labelling 
requirements of the Biosafety Protocol enable Western European importers to identify such 
                                                 
5 For a similar analysis to the present one but where the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy is assumed to have 





shipments and that basically all oilseed and coarse grain exports from GM-adopting regions will 
be labelled “may contain GMOs”. Hence the distinction between GM and GM-free products is 
simplified to one that relates directly to the country of origin
6. This import ban scenario reflects 
the most extreme application of the precautionary principle within the framework of the 
Biosafety Protocol.  
 
Scenario 1: Selected non-European regions adopt GM coarse grains and oilseeds 
Table 1 reports the results of the first experiment for selected regions, with Western 
Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa as non-adopters and the other reported regions (North America, 
Southern Cone, China and India) as adopters of GM coarse grains and oilseeds. A 5% reduction 
in overall production costs in these sectors leads to increases in coarse grains production of 
between 0.4% and 2.1%, and increases in oilseed production of between 1.1% and 4.6% in the 
GM-adopting regions. The production responses are generally larger for oilseeds as compared 
with coarse grains. This is because a larger share of oilseed production as compared with coarse 
grains production is destined for export markets in all the reported regions, and hence oilseed 
production is not limited to the same extent by domestic demand, which is less price-elastic. 
Increased oilseed production leads to lower market prices and hence cheaper costs of production 
in the vegetable oils and fats sectors, expanding output there. This expansion is particularly 
marked in the Southern Cone region of South America where no less than one-fourth of this 
production is sold on foreign markets, thereby allowing for a larger production response to the 
reduced costs of production in this sector. In North America coarse grains are also used as 
livestock feed, and hence the lower feed prices lead to an expansion of the livestock and meat 
processing sectors.  
Due to the very large world market shares of oilseeds from North and South America and 
coarse grains from North America, the increased supply from these regions causes world prices 
for coarse grains and oilseeds to decline by 4.0% and 4.5%, respectively. As a consequence of 
the more intense competition from abroad, production of coarse grains and oilseeds declines in 
the non-adopting regions. This is particularly so in Western Europe, a major net importer of 
                                                 
6 By distinguishing between GMO-inclusive and GMO-free products by country of origin, one concern may be that 
GM-adopting regions channel their exports to the country or region imposing the import ban (here Western Europe) 
through third countries that are indifferent as to the content of GMOs and that do not adopt GM technology in their 





oilseeds, of which 47% initially comes from North America. Coarse grain imports into Western 
Europe increase only slightly (0.1%), but the increased competition and lower price are enough 
to entail a 4.5% decline in Western European production. In the developing countries too, 
production of coarse grains and oilseeds is reduced slightly. The changes in India, however, are 
relatively small compared with e.g. China and the Southern Cone region. This is explained by the 
domestic market orientation of these sales. As a consequence, the relatively small production 
increase causes rather substantial declines in market prices for these products, which in turn 
benefits the other agricultural sectors through vertical linkages. For example, 67% of 
intermediate demand for coarse grains and 37% of intermediate demand for oilseeds in India 
stems from the livestock sector.  
  The economic welfare effects of this productivity shock are difficult to capture fully. One 
reason is that this technology may increase or decrease the gap between the private and social 
marginal costs of production. Some attributes of GM crops lead to less spraying, for example, 
while other attributes may impose negative environmental externalities (e.g., cross-pollination 
with neighbouring organic crops). Until more-precise information becomes available, we simply 
assume the gap between the private and social marginal costs of production remains unchanged. 
A second reason is that consumers may not consider the GM-free and GM-included maize or 
soybean products to be identical. Yet the premium for GM-free or discount for GM-inclusive 
products has been rather small to date, so we ignore this possibility. With those two assumptions, 
it is possible to use the standard equivalent variation in income calculus in the GTAP model to 
estimate the gross economic welfare effects on each region represented in the model (see Hertel 
1997), from which the costs of research and adoption should be subtracted with appropriate 
discounting to account for the delay between research investments and their impacts. 
Global economic welfare (so measured) is boosted in this first scenario by US$9.9 billion 
per year, two-thirds of which is enjoyed by the adopting regions (Table 1(b)). It is noteworthy 
that all regions (both adopting and non-adopting) gain in terms of economic welfare except Sub-
Saharan Africa. The welfare decomposition in Table 1(b) shows that most of this gain stems 
directly from the technology boost. The net-exporting GM-adopters experience worsened terms 
of trade due to increased competition on world markets, but this adverse welfare effect is 
outweighed by the positive effect of the technological boost. Western Europe gains from the 





because increased competition from abroad shifts domestic resources out of relatively highly 
assisted segments of EU agriculture. The group of other high-income countries, among which are 
the Asian nations that are relatively large net importers of the GM-potential crops, benefits 
equally from lower import prices and a more efficient use of resources in domestic production.
7   
 
Scenario 2: Western Europe bans the imports of GM coarse grains and oilseeds 
A Western European ban on the imports of genetically modified coarse grains and 
oilseeds would change the situation rather dramatically, especially for the oilseed sector in North 
America, which is initially highly dependent on the EU market. The result of the European ban is 
not only a decline in total North American oilseed exports by almost 30%, but also a production 
decline of 10%, pulling resources such as land out of this sector (Table 2). For coarse grains, by 
contrast, only 18% of North American production is exported and just 8% of those exports are 
destined for Western Europe. Therefore the ban does not affect North American production and 
exports of coarse grains to the same extent as for oilseeds, although the downward pressure on 
the international price of maize nonetheless dampens the production-enhancing effect of the 
technological boost significantly. Similar effects are evident in the other GM adopting regions, 
except for India – once again because its production of these particular crops is largely 
unaffected by world market developments.  
For Sub-Saharan Africa, which by assumption is unable to adopt the new GM 
technology, access to the Western European markets when other competitors are excluded 
expands. Oilseed exports from this region rise dramatically, by enough to increase domestic 
production by 4%. Western Europe increases its own production of oilseeds, however, so the 
aggregate increase in its oilseed imports amounts to less than 1%. Its production of coarse grains 
also increases, but proportionately not as much because of an initial high degree of self-
sufficiency. The shift from imported oilseeds and coarse grains to domestically produced 
products has implications further downstream. Given an imperfect degree of substitution in 
                                                 
7 In the present analysis no attempt has been made to allocate national welfare gains among household groups. That 
could be done simply by using the GTAP model’s estimates of changes in product and factor prices and information 
on different households’ shares of expenditure on the various products and of income from the various factors 
(different types of labour, land, and other forms of capital). Such an approach is more satisfactory than the standard 
partial equilibrium distinction between producers, consumers and taxpayers (see, e.g., Alston, Edwards and 
Freebairn 1988) since each household has an interest in at least two of those outcomes. This is especially true in 
poor countries where the vast majority of households include agricultural producers but they have widely varying 





production between domestic and imported intermediate inputs, the higher prices on 
domestically produced grains and oilseeds mean that livestock feed is slightly more expensive 
(half of intermediate demand for coarse grains in Western Europe stems from the livestock 
sector). Inputs to the other food processing industries, particularly the vegetable oils and fats 
sector, also are more expensive. As a consequence, production in these downstream sectors 
declines and competing imports increase.  
   Aggregate economic welfare implications of this scenario as compared with scenario 1 
are substantially different. Western Europe now experiences a decline in aggregate welfare of 
US$4.3 billion per year instead of a boost of $2.0 billion (compare Tables 2(b) and 1(b)). Taking 
a closer look at the decomposition of the welfare changes reveals that adverse allocative 
efficiency effects explain the decline. Most significantly, resources are forced into producing 
oilseeds, of which a substantial amount was previously imported. Consumer welfare in Western 
Europe is reduced in this scenario because, given that those consumers are assumed to be 
indifferent between GM-inclusive and GM-free crops, the import ban restricts them from 
benefiting from lower international prices.
8 
The key exporters of the GM products, North America, Southern Cone and China, all 
show a smaller gain in welfare in this as compared with the scenario in which there is no EU 
response. Net importers of corn and soybean (e.g. ‘Other high-income’ which is mostly East 
Asia), by contrast, are slightly better off in this than the first scenario. Meanwhile, the countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa are affected in a slight positive instead of slight negative way, gaining 
from better terms of trade. In particular a higher price is obtained for their oilseed exports to 
Western European markets in this as compared with the first scenario.  
Two-thirds of the global gains from the new GM technology as measured in scenario 1 
are eroded by the import ban imposed by Western Europe: they fall from $9.9 billion per year to 
just $3.4 billion (assuming as before that consumers are indifferent between GM-free and GM-
inclusive foods and there is no net change in the extent of externalities). Almost the entire 
erosion in economic welfare is borne in Western Europe, with the small residual borne by the 
net-exporting adopters (mainly North America and the Southern Cone region). Since the non-
adopting regions outside Europe generally purchase most of their imported coarse grains and 
                                                 
8 Of course the welfare loss reported above would be less in so far as Western Europeans value a ban on GM 





oilseeds from North America, they benefit even more from lower import prices: their welfare is 
estimated to be greater by almost one-fifth in the case of a Western European import ban as 
compared with no European reaction.
9 
 
How different would the welfare effects of GMO adoption be in the absence of agricultural 
protection in Western Europe? 
 
  The above results take as given the agricultural protection policies currently in 
place in Western Europe. Obviously the location of global food production would be different 
without that protectionism, which raises the question as to how much impact current policies are 
having on the gains from GMO research. Alston, Edwards and Freebairn (1988) demonstrate 
using partial equilibrium analysis that the impact depends on numerous variables and can be 
positive or negative for different participants but in aggregate is likely to be small. For the case 
in hand, in the absence of Western Europe’s protectionism the GM-adopting countries would 
have a larger share of global crop production, which would boost the global gains from their 
adoption of GMO research. But without its protectionism the crop mix would be different in 
Western Europe, in which case a ban on imports of GM products may be less costly than with 
current policies still in place, thereby offsetting the gains from greater GM crop production 
elsewhere. 
As an empirical test, we re-ran the above two simulations but simultaneously removed all 
forms of protection to primary agricultural industries in Western Europe. The welfare results are 
reported in Table 3. The global welfare effects are about $15 billion per year higher in this 
second set of scenarios where GMO adoption is accompanied by the removal of current price-
                                                 
9 Our earlier analysis (Nielsen and Anderson 2001) includes a third scenario that assumes, as an alternative to an 
import ban, that Western European consumers who have a strong bias against genetically modified crops can 
express their preferences through market mechanisms rather than through a government-implemented import ban. 
This has a much less damaging effect on production in the GM-adopting countries. In particular, that earlier study 
analyses the impact of a partial shift in Western European preferences away from imported coarse grains and 
oilseeds from GM-producing countries and in favour of domestically produced crops. The estimated decline in 
economic welfare that Western Europe would experience if it banned coarse grain and oilseed imports is changed to 
a slight gain in this scenario (although recall that scenario 2 assumes consumers are indifferent to whether a food 
contains GMOs). The dramatic worsening of resource allocative efficiency in scenario 2 is changed to a slight 
improvement in this one, because production in the lightly assisted oilseeds sector increases and production in all 
other (more heavily distorted) agri-food sectors in Western Europe declines. Anderson, Nielsen, Robinson and 





distorting policies in Western Europe. That $15 billion represents the magnitude of the annual 
welfare cost of those price-distorting policies. 
Of more interest here are the differences between the welfare effects of GMO adoption 
without and with an import ban by Western Europe in this second situation, summarized in Table 
3, as compared with the situation summarized in Tables 1 and 2. Those differences are reported 
in Table 4. What they suggest is that, as predicted by Alston, Edwards and Freebairn (1988), the 
current protectionist policies of Western Europe are having little impact on the difference in 
global gains from GMO research as simulated here. In fact the reduction in the global welfare 
gains from GMO adoption that a European import ban would impose would be slightly smaller 
in the absence of Europe’s current farm protection policies ($5.1 instead of $6.4 billion per year). 
But, also as predicted by Alston, Edwards and Freebairn (1988), the distribution of that 
difference is not even. Without that protectionism, a European import ban would hurt GM 
adopting countries by $1 billion per year less but would help non-adopters outside of Western 
Europe by $2.8 billion less, while affecting by very little the ban’s impact on the indirect gain 
Western Europe would otherwise enjoy from adoption elsewhere of the new biotechnology. As 





The empirical analysis performed here shows that the most extreme use of European 
trade provisions, namely an import ban on imports of crops from GMO-adopting countries, 
would be very costly in terms of economic welfare for the Western European region itself – a 
cost which governments in the region need to weigh against the perceived benefits to voters of 
adopting the precautionary principle in this way. Imposing a ban hinders European consumers 
and intermediate demanders in gaining from lower import prices, domestic production of corn 
and soybean is forced to rise at the expense of other production, and hence overall allocative 
efficiency in the region is worsened. The GM-adopting regions still enjoy welfare gains due to 
the dominating positive effect of the assumed productivity boost embodied in the GM crops, but 
                                                                                                                                                             
free and GM-inclusive products when those products are segmented in the marketplace. This latter approach is also 





those gains are reduced by the import ban as compared with the scenario in which GM crops are 
traded freely. To the extent that some developing and other countries do not adopt GM crops (by 
choice or otherwise) and they can verify this at the Western European borders, our results 
suggest it is possible they could gain in gross terms – but only slightly -- from retaining access to 
Europe’s GMO-free markets when others are excluded. Whether they gain in net terms would 
depend on the cost of compliance with European regulations. A comparison between those 
results and those from the second set of simulations reveals that the gains to those developing 
countries from the ban would be less (as would the GM-adopting countries’ loss) in the absence 
of Western European protectionist policies. 
The above analysis assumes throughout that the new technology is exogenous. This is 
clearly just an analytical convenience. In practice the investment in new agricultural technologies 
is less the lower are prices of farm products (and hence the greater is agricultural protectionism 
abroad), and the greater are consumers’ and environmentalists’ concerns with the technology. 
The more those latter concerns are unwarranted, the more developing countries are being 
unnecessarily denied benefits from the biotechnology revolution. 
The different national regulatory regimes towards GM products are bound to raise 
questions about their compatibility with existing WTO agreements. Indeed GMOs have 
considerable potential to generate trade frictions in the years ahead as WTO members argue 
about the extent to which the precautionary principle should be envoked (Anderson and Nielsen 
2002). The above estimated welfare effects of a ban on EU imports of GM products may not 
seem huge, but two things need to be kept in mind. One is that the above results are based on the 
assumed flexibility of markets in the GTAP model, with most of the global welfare loss from an 
import ban being borne by the banning region.  The other is that this study focuses on a small 
number of countries adopting GM technology for just two products, and with defensive reactions 
by just one (albeit the largest and most likely) region. The potential of this new biotechnology 
and the associated gains through trade in the decades ahead are many times greater than the 
above estimates, and ultimately could be huge as a percentage of incomes of poor people in 
developing countries.
10 Hence so too are the stakes in terms of potential trade disputes, should 
governments respond to GMO developments in ways that upset other WTO members. 
                                                 
10 On the role agricultural research can play in alleviating poverty in developing countries, see Hazell and Haddad 





Nonetheless, the EU or some other countries may still choose to impose import 
restrictions on GM products, for at least four reasons. First, the Biosafety Protocol might be 
interpreted by them as absolving them of their WTO obligations not to raise import barriers. 
Second, if domestic production of GM crops is banned in Europe, farmers there would join with 
GMO protesters in calling for a raising of import barriers so as to keep out lower-cost ‘unfair’ 
competition. Third, the on-going lowering of import barriers, following the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture and the information revolution’s impact in reducing costs of trading 
internationally, pressure import-competing farmers to look for other ways of cutting imports.
11 
And fourth, the cost of banning GMO imports in Western Europe amounts to barely US$15 per 
capita per year – hardly a major economic impediment to a high-income region imposing an 
import ban. 
The scope for further economic analysis of the economics of biotech research is 
considerable. An obvious extension of the present study is to explore the effects of developing 
countries’ policies (which on average discriminate against agriculture) on the rewards in those 
countries from the adoption of new biotechnologies abroad and at home. Another extension is to 
identify different types of households within the GTAP model so that the within-country income 
distributional and poverty alleviation consequences of GMO adoption – and of policy and 
consumer reactions to GMO trade – can be estimated.
12 Once that is done, we will be in a better 
position to move from normative to positive analyses and address such questions as to why 
policies towards GMOs are so different across countries. Arguably neither the US nor the EU 
policies are anywhere near optimal: the US having very few regulations even though there are 
uncertainties as to the environmental effects of GM crop production and the food safety 
consequences of GMO consumption; and the EU having the most extreme of regulations to deal 
with those issues. Are these differences simply a result of different consumer and 
environmentalist attitudes in the two regions, as suggested by many analysts (e.g., Benauer and 
                                                 
11 The emergence of the concept of agriculture’s so-called ‘multifunctionality’, and the call for trade policy and the 
WTO to deal with environmental and labour standards issues, can be viewed in a similar light (Anderson 1998, 
2000).  
12 The increasing concern in both rich and poor countries about who gains and who loses from trade and economic 
growth has meant that the GTAP model is beginning to be used for exploring the distributional and poverty 
implications of trade liberalization. See, for example, the study of trade reform in China by Anderson, Huang and 
Ianchovichina (2002) and a global study by Hertel et al. (2002). Distributional analyses of agricultural research 
impacts can piggy-back on such studies once households are specified in such models. In doing so, the nationality of 





Meins 2001)? Or are they due to different vested interests of producers, who are exerting their 
lobbying influence on this area of policy just as they do in the area of traditional price and trade 
policies? Given the scope that GMOs provide for re-instrumenting agricultural protectionism in 
the wake of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture and its likely extension following the 
on-going Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, this promises to be a high-payoff area 
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Table 1. Scenario 1: Effects of selected regions
a adopting GM maize and soybean 














Production         
Coarse grain  2.1 1.6 1.0 0.4 -4.5 -2.3 -5.0
Oilseeds 3.6 4.6 1.8 1.1 -11.2 -1.3 -3.4
Livestock 0.8 -0.0 0.1 0.4 -0.2 -0.1 -0.8
Meat & dairy  0.5 0.0 0.1 1.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.6
Veg. oils, fats  1.1 4.5 1.4 0.0 -0.9 -1.2 -2.1
Other foods  0.2 0.1 0.4 1.5 -0.1 0.0 -0.3
Market prices        
Coarse grain  -5.5 -5.5 -5.6 -6.7 -0.5 -0.4 -0.8
Oilseeds -5.5 -5.3 -5.6 -6.5 -1.2 -0.3 -0.7
Livestock -1.8 -0.3 -0.4 -1.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4
Meat & dairy  -1.0 -0.2 -0.3 -1.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
Veg. oils, fats  -2.4 -3.1 -2.6 -1.0 -0.5 -0.2 -0.3
Other foods  -0.3 -0.2 -0.5 -1.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1
Exports
b          
Coarse grain  8.5 13.3 16.8 37.3 -11.5 -20 -26.8
Oilseeds 8.5 10.5 8.2 21.5 -20.5 -26.5 -28.4
Livestock 8.9 -2.0 -3.3 9.4 -1.1 -1.5 -1.5
Meat & dairy  4.8 -0.9 -0.9 5.8 -0.5 -0.2 -1.3
Veg. oils, fats  5.8 14.3 5.6 -3.8 -4.9 -5.3 -10.9
Other foods  0.2 0.1 1.6 7.6 -0.6 0.1 -1.3
Imports
b          
Coarse grain  -1.6 -4.6 -4.2 -20.5 0.1 11.3 11.3
Oilseeds -2.6 -9.2 -1.6 -8.6 2.5 16.5 13.7
Livestock -2.1 1.3 0.9 -5.2 0.2 0.5 0.5
Meat & dairy  -1.9 0.2 0.8 -1.7 -0.0 0.1 0.0
Veg. oils, fats  -3.7 -3.6 -1.7 3.1 1.3 3.4 3.7
Other foods  0 -0.1 -0.6 -3.1 0.1 -0.1 0.4




Decomposition of welfare results,  
contribution of  (US$ million): 




 trade effects 
Technical
 change effects
North America             2,624        -137     -1,008                   3,746
Southern Cone                826         120        -223          923
China                839         113           66          672
India             1,265         182            -9        1,094
Western Europe             2,010      1,755         253              0
Sub-Saharan Africa       -9            -2            -9              0
Aust/New Zealand
                 -70                       3           -71              0
Japan &Asian NIEs  1,256 551 712 0
Other dev/transition             1,120        171         289         673
WORLD             9,859     2,756             0       7,108
a North America, Mexico, Southern Cone, China, Rest of East Asia, India, and South Africa.        
b Includes intra-regional trade. 





Table 2. Scenario 2: Effects of selected regions
a adopting GM maize and soybean plus WE bans GM imports 














Production         
Cereal grain  0.9  0.0 0.8 0.4 5.3 -2.2  -5.2
Oilseeds -10.2  -3.6 -0.8 0.8 66.4 4.4  -1.3
Livestock 1.2  0.3 0.2 0.4 -0.8 0.0  -0.4
Meat & dairy  0.8  0.3 0.2 1.4 -0.5 -0.0  -0.5
Veg.oils,fats 2.4  8.1 1.6 0.1 -3.4 0.0  -2.1
Other foods  0.3  0.4 0.5 1.6 -0.5 -0.1  -0.4
Market prices        
Cereal grain  -6.2  -6.0 -5.6 -6.7 0.8 -0.0  -0.7
Oilseeds -7.4  -6.8 -6.0 -6.5 5.8 0.4  -0.4
Livestock -2.2  -0.7 -0.4 -1.4 0.5 0.1  -0.3
Meat & dairy  -1.3  -0.4 -0.3 -1.0 0.3 0.1  -0.2
Veg.oils,fats -3.3  -4.0 -2.7 -1.0 2.0 0.0  -0.2
Other foods  -0.4  -0.3 -0.5 -1.0 0.1 0.0  -0.1
Exports
b         
Cereal grain  0.3  -2.9 5.0 23.4 15.9 -13.1  -27.1
Oilseeds -28.8  -69.2 -18.4 -8.7 167.2 105.0  3.8
Livestock 13.7  4.0 -1.4 12.6 -3.8 -1.8  -0.4
Meat & dairy  7.5  2.1 0.1 7.1 -1.4 0.3  -1.2
Veg.oils,fats 14.4  26.2 7.0 1.3 -15.0 5.8  -12.1
Other foods  1.5  1.9 2.0 8.0 -1.4 -0.6  -1.4
Imports
b         
Cereal grain  -1.9  -5.3 -2.8 -20 3.3 13.4  13.4
Oilseeds -5.6  -21.9 3.0 -3.7 0.6 22.5  18.6
Livestock -3.2  0.1 0.1 -5.9 0.9 0.5  0.7
Meat & dairy  -2.8  -0.5 0.8 -1.8 -0.2 -0.0  -0.2
Veg.oils,fats -7.7  -5.5 -1.7 4.0 5.5 2.4  2.6
Other foods  -0.6  -0.6 -0.8 -2.8 0.1 0.2  0.3





Decomposition of welfare results (US$ million pa):  
 




 trade effects 
Technical
 change effects
North America              2,299                       27                  -1,372                   3,641
Southern Cone                663                        71        -303                                  893
China                804           74           70          669
India             1,277         190            -3        1,092
Western Europe           -4,334     -4,601         257              0
Sub-Saharan Africa                 42             5           38              0
Aust/New Zealand
                -52                      -1          -49              0
Japan &Asian NIEs  1,423 593 831 0
Other dev/transition             1,296        101                    531  672
WORLD             3,419                 -3,541                                     0          6,966
a North America, Mexico, Southern Cone, China, Rest of East Asia, India, and South Africa.     
b Includes intra-





Table 3. Economic welfare effects of selected non-European regions adopting GM coarse grains and 
oilseeds and agricultural protection in Western Europe removed, without and with a Western 
European ban on imports from GM regions  
 
 






Decomposition of welfare results,  
contribution of  (US$ million): 







North America  4,359 -2,032 2,280 4,056
Southern Cone  1,775 400 360 985
China 719 82 -37 691
India 1,225 87 44 1,100
Western Europe  17,896 22,318 -4,539 0
Sub-Saharan Africa  203 3 211 0
Australia and NZ  427 -42 464 0
Japan & Asian NIEs  -2,180 -1,443 -611 0
Other developing 
and transition econs.  974 -1,474 1,782 0










Decomposition of welfare results,  
contribution of  (US$ million): 







North America  3,138 -1,816 1,153 3,771
Southern Cone  1,425 349 135 915
China 700 44 -9 682
India 1,252 104 56 1,097
Western Europe  11,118 16,970 -5985 0
Sub-Saharan Africa  789 29 789 0
Australia and NZ  505 -39 537 0
Japan & Asian NIEs  -1,536 -1,224 -187 0
Other developing 
and transition econs.  2,915 -1,218 3,511 0









Table 4. Differences between economic welfare effects of selected non-European regions adopting 
GM coarse grains and oilseeds with a Western European ban on imports from GM regions vs. no 
ban (i.e., the loss associated with the ban) 
 
 







Decomposition of welfare results,  
contribution of  (US$ million): 




 trade effects 
Technical
 change effects
GM adopters  -511 84 -434  -142
Western Europe  -6,344 -6,356 4  0
Other non-adopters  415 -25 430 0










Decomposition of welfare results,  
contribution of  (US$ million): 




 trade effects 
Technical
 change effects
GM adopters  -1,563 144 -1,315  -367
Western Europe  -6,778 -5,348 -1,446  0
Other non-adopters  3,244 447 2,761  0
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